The Revival of Interest in Justice
Harlan's Flexible Due Process
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Although the Supreme Court often "tangles" equal protection
and due process analyses in its opinions, it is preferable not to
conflate concepts that are most useful ifkept separate. Indeed, it
is objectionable to twist together the due process and equal protection clauses, because the "new" equal protectionapproach, developed during the Warren era, places too heavy a burden on the
government to justify classifications. A flexible balancing approach is appropriatefor resolution of the due process clause issue, and a less intrusive, means-focused equal protection
methodology is appropriatefor resolution of the equality issue.
Justice Harlan believed that the ends-oriented equal protection
doctrine shifted the Court'sfocus of inquiry awayfrom its proper
concern, which was to inquire whether classifications were
clearly and unjustifiably unrelated to legitimate governmental
objectives. A revival of interest in Justice Harlan's approachis
indicated by several recent United States Supreme Court
decisions.
PRELMINARY REMARKS
The guarantees of the equal protection clause' and the due process of law clauses, 2 although not mutually exclusive, 3 are, and
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Kuchinsky, who prepared the chart at the end of this article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Id. amends. V & XIV.
3. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court invalidated the state's
ban on interracial marriages. The Court held that the racial classification violated
July, 1982

Vol. 19

No. 4

should be kept, conceptually distinct. 4 The function of the equal
protection clause is to protect all individuals and classes from
comparatively disadvantageous distinctions, but laws that burden
all persons equally may nevertheless violate the due process
clause. It follows that the equal protection clause is triggered
when the government treats individuals disparately; the due process clause may be triggered even though the government treats
all individuals the same.5 Adequate, not equal, protection is guaranteed by due process of law.
Substantive due process doctrine also differs from procedural
due process. When an individual is isolated owing to some alleged (but deniable) imisconduct, characteristic, or tendency, the
constitutional question pertains to the type of individualized
hearing, if any, which is due. 6 The adequacy of procedural safeguards is usually irrelevant when a challenger attacks the validity
of applicable substantive law. 7 Under such circumstances, the isthe equal protection clause and that the burden on liberty violated due process of
law. One commentator has noted: 'Thus, equal protection and due process, as independent constitutional guarantees, may both be violated in some circum-

stances." Note, EqualProtectionand Due Process: ContrastingMethods of Review
Under FourteenthAmendment Doctrine, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L L, REV. 529, 531 (1979)
(succinct analysis of the differences between equal protection and due process of
law doctrines).

4. "Although due process and equal protection arguments often may be
transformed into each other,. . . there is value in maintaining the conceptual distinction." Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1128 n.15 (5th Cir. 1978). The distinction is this: The equal protection clause argument focuses on the challenged
classification; the due process clause focuses on the burdened constitutionally protected right or liberty. See Note, supra note 3, at 531-33.
5. Due process review is triggered by the deprivation of protected personal
interests regardless of whether a classification is involved. Thus, a statute may,
without imposing any classifications, deprive all persons of an interest protected
under due process; clearly the absence of a classification should not save the statute from invalidation. Note, supra note 3, at 533. Justice Rehnquist writes, "'Due
process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with
the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
Since due process concepts are invoked to prevent unfairness and injustice,
which, like due process itself, are concepts that resist specific definition, the difficulty of articulating a completely informative standard of due process is not surprising. It is a concept that is designed "for an undefined and expanding future."
Hurtado v. California, 100 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1884).
6. See generally Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L, REV. 1267
(1975). Professor Grey writes, "Procedural fairness does not include those fundamental substantive rights which in our constitutional law are enforced in the
name of due process-rights such as the freedom of speech and religion ...or the
rights of liberty and privacy usually characterized as aspects of substantive due
process." Grey, ProceduralFairness and Substantive Rights, in DUE PRocEss:
Nosios XVIII 182 (1977). The primary function of procedural due process, Grey
observes, is "designed to promote the correct decision of disputes." Id. at 184.
7. But see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S.Ct. 1148 (1982) (statute as
interpreted and applied violated procedural due process). The Court has held that
procedural due process violations occur "if indigents are singled out by the State
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sue is whether the Constitution imposes restrictions upon the
scope, reach and character of the challenged exercise of legislative power.8
Equal protection principles protect members of classes from
unreasonable or invidious classifications. 9 A disadvantageous
classification is usually invidious when deemed hostile or stigmatizing.10 A classification is intolerably imprecise (unrelated to the
government's goal) to the extent that it is overinclusive
(designates for a benefit or burden more persons than is necessary) or underinclusive (excludes from a benefit or burden more
and denied meaningful access to the appellate system because of their poverty."
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974). Justice Rehnquist concedes that this exception is not an "entirely satisfactory" explanation for the Court's solicitude towards indigents compelled by the state to defend themselves against criminal
charges. Id. at 609. It is not a satisfactory explanation because the Court's rationale in the "access to court" cases (see infra text accompanying notes 27-29) is a
hybrid of equal protection and substantive and procedural due process; in other
words, a conceptual disaster. See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (pursuant to irrebuttable presumption analysis, the Court invalidated state residency
test used by the state to determine eligibility for tuition preferences for in-state
students at state universities). For a brief discussion of the requirement of an individualized determination which is the judicial remedy for an irrebuttable presumption, see infra.note 111.
8. The doctrine of "void for vagueness" is also a due process doctrine. The
vices of statutes and rules which are void for vagueness consist in their lack of fair
warning and the excessive latitude given to administrators, prosecutors, judges
and juries for erratic, discriminatory or overreaching exercises of authority. See
A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 151 (1962). See generally Amsterdam,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960). It does not seem particularly important to categorize this doctrine as
either procedural or substantive due process, and it could be argued that it is a
hybrid.
9. "The Equal Protection Clause provides a basis for challenging legislative
classifications that treat one group of persons as inferior or superior to others, and
for contending that general rules are being applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory way." Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 423-24 (1981). In their seminal article, Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek pointed out that:
Due process is ... a weapon blunted out and scarred in the defense of
property. The present Court, conscious of its destiny as the special guardian of human or civil rights, may well wish to develop some alternative to
due process as a sanctuary for these rights. The equal protection clause
has much to recommend it for this purpose.
Tussman &tenBroek, The Equal Protectionof the Laws, 37 CALwF. L_REv. 341, 364
(1949); see also Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 39 (historical perspective of the "new" substantive equal protection); Mendelson, From Warren to Burger: The Rise and Decline of Substantive Equal Protection, 66 Am. POL. ScL REV. 1226 (1972).
10. See generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal ProtectionClause, 5 PHl. & PUB.
AFF. 107 (1976); Tussman &tenBroek, supra note 9; Note, supra note 3.

persons than is necessary)." If a court holds a classification to be
invalid, this does not mean that the government lacks power to
regulate the subject matter; the government simply must use a
more precise classification. One can, but should not, exaggerate
the virtue of equal protection analysis as a value-neutral meansoriented approach. When a statute is invalidated by a federal
court, representative government is still stymied by unelected officials whether their warrant is the equal protection or the due
process clause. But a means-focused intervention is not based on
a subjective evaluation of the importance of governmental ends
when the court's decision plausibly rests on the unjustifiable imprecision of a challenged classification. Hence equal protection
analysis is a less intrusive tool of judicial intervention.
The equality requirement of the equal protection clause protects all persons and classes from every unjust comparison disadvantaging certain politically powerless or traditionally
stigmatized groups. 12 Since the equal protection clause is primarily concerned with classification, the courts decide whether a
challenged classification is disfavored or suspect. If neither, the
court determines whether the classification is substantially related to the governmental goal which made the legislative linedrawing advisable in the first place. There should not be an emphasis on balancing competing interests in an equal protection
case.13
If the challenged classification is suspect, the Court requires
the government to justify the classification by demonstrating that
a "compelling interest" is substantially furthered in the least discriminatory way.14 The compelling interest test in this context
ideally does not involve weighing the harm to the group disadvantaged against the benefit accruing to society from the classification.15 The compelling interest test is a method used to flush out
unconstitutional motivation.16 Although the Court requires the
government's goal to be important, not trivial, the importance of
the goal is simply an indicator of the government's neutrality. In
this respect, as Professor Clark has written, "[One can acknowledge a kind of balancing in this context."'17 But the methodology
"of looking for evidence of probable legislative prejudice is differ11. Fiss, supra note 10, at 111 (citing Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 9).
12. See also Note, supra note 3.
13. Id. at 529-33.
14. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. But see Fiss, supra note 10, at 166-68; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REV. 1065, 1103 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
16. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisnUST 146 (1980).
17. Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 981 (1978).
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ent from balancing the good and the bad effects of the law.' l 8 Unfortunately, since many courts confound equal protection doctrine
with substantive due process balancing, this distinction becomes

blurred.
This article discusses how the Supreme Court, over a period of
years, ignored important distinctions between the concepts of due
process and equal protection.19 This was invariably accomplished
over the objection of Mr. Justice Harlan. The article further suggests that in the 1980's, the prospects are good for the adoption of
Justice Harlan's approach. More than an aesthetic notion of doctrinal purity is at stake. In the Constitution, liberty and equality
are in tension with each other. At times, liberty may be limited
by the government to achieve equality. Conversely, equality at
times may be subordinated to liberty. The tangling of due process and equal protection methodologies distorts the concepts of
liberty and equality. 20
18. Id.; see also J. ELY, supra note 16, at 145-47, 247 n.46. The compelling interest test invoked in the "new" equal protection cases is a formulation that is derived from Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in a first amendment case, Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957), an opinion which Justice Harlan joined.
The test obviously was designed to be strict. Although Justice Harlan continued
to apply the compelling interest test in first amendment cases without minimizing
the state's heavy burden of justification, "his balancing typically entailed a fair
and careful evaluation of the asserted state justifications for impinging on first
amendment interests." Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing
Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1972). The compelling interest test, however, as applied by the Warren Court in the "new" equal protection cases-notwithstanding Justice Harlan's objections-was less sensitive to
the competing interests, less flexible and always fatal.
19. See also Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the FourteenthAmendment, 77
MIcH. L. REV. 981 (1979); Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization
andAppraisal, 79 COLUm. L. REV. 1023 (1979).
20. One could invoke a general bridging concept, which subsumes liberty and
equality, for example-equal concern and respect for each person's autonomy.
But such a bridging concept, given the absence of an all-encompassing supreme
moral principle implicit in the Constitution would not be deduced from the Constitution, but induced from the cases and commentary. Although it removes some of
the tension between the concepts subsumed, an abstract concept like equal concern and respect, or justice, for that matter, is too general to help judges decide
concrete cases. In a particular case, judges should employ standards that channel
their discretion. It is, therefore, more prudent to maintain the traditional distinction between liberty, which pertains to substantive justice, and equality, which so
far as the fourteenth amendment is concerned, pertains to formal justice. Both
concepts are in the Constitution; so, nothing is lost but clarity and candor by intermixing the two.
Formal justice is the concept implicit in the equal protection clause; in other
words, persons similarly situated should be similarly treated with respect to the
purpose of a law. If the purpose of a law is legitimate, its importance should not

The entanglement began in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson.2 1 The challenged statute provided for the sterilization of
habitual criminals, as defined by the act, but made exceptions for
crimes of embezzlement, political offenses, and for violations of
prohibitory laws or revenue acts. 22 The exemptions, although
grossly over- and underinclusive, might have been upheld, owing
to the deference usually accorded the legislature in equal protec-

tion cases. Justice Douglas's opinion, however, referred to procreation as "one of the basic civil rights of man."23 His identification

of procreation as a fundamental right enabled him to apply strict
scrutiny.
Ordinarily the equal protection clause is not a source of fundamental rights. 24 Justice Douglas's opinion did suggest that a state
sterilization statute could be used against "races or types which
are inimical to the dominant group."2 5 There was no showing,
however, that the state was motivated by any such impermissible
be assessed by the court. A court must, therefore, defer to the reasoned judgment
of the legislature, whether the legislature classified for instrumental reasons or
owing to its sense of fitness, moral or otherwise. This is the essence of means-focused equal protection analysis. I, therefore, cannot completely accept Professor
Alexander's statement that "the Supreme Court's tangling of equal protection and
due process is quite understandable and perhaps inevitable." Alexander, Modem
Equal Protection Theories: A Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 Omao
STATE L. J. 3, 51 (1981).

Professor Alexander is surely on firm logical ground when he points out that
"[e]very violation of due process can be viewed as an equal protection violation in
the sense that every due process violation burdens some (unjustifiably) more than
others." Id. at 56. But Alexander would agree that it does not follow that every
law, which complies with substantive due process demands, also complies with
equal protection clause requirements. Nor does it follow that a classification
which has the effect of comparatively disadvantaging the members of some group
with respect to their enjoyment of a fundamental interest is government action
that triggers strict scrutiny (if the challenged law can survive the less strict due
process balancing test). The Supreme Court, however, occasionally falls into the
trap of applying its strictest scrutiny to decide whether classifications allocating
benefits are valid while recognizing that no person has been deprived by the government of the minimum essentials of constitutionally protected liberty.
If a court takes the position that the government has a duty not to benefit some,
because others (who are not made worse off in an absolute sense) will be comparatively disadvantaged in their enjoyment of fundamental interests, the court is injecting a particular view of morality into the equal protection clause. When more
than a reasoned judgment is demanded of the legislature, in the interest of some
notion of substantive justice, of course, the entanglement between the due process
and equal protection clauses becomes inevitable. I do not deny that there is an
area of inevitable overlap between the two concepts, but this article urges readers
to be attentive to the differences rather than the similarities.
21. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
22. Id. at 537.
23. Id. at 541.
24. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33
(1973) ("It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.").
25. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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The real issue raised by cases like Skinner is whether procreation is a constitutionally protected liberty; the rhetoric of equality
simply sidesteps the issue. Yet, the Court held the Oklahoma
statute violative of equal protection. To the extent that Justice
Douglas was implying that the legislature lacks power to prevent
transmission of hereditary criminal traits by sterilization (and
this seems to be the essence of his message), he was applying the
doctrine of substantive due process.
It was the egalitarianism of Skinner that the Warren Court
adopted as its model for the protection of fundamental interests.
The form of strict scrutiny which evolved during the Warren
Court era, however, placed too heavy a burden of persuasion on
the government. The government usually is unable to persuade
the Court that its classification is the least discriminatory alternative available.
In cases involving alleged undue burdens on liberty the courts
should focus on the extent of the burden. Due process standards
require the Court to accommodate, with sensitivity, the competing interests of both the government and the individual whose interests are burdened by governmental action. Justice Harlan
believed in this flexible approach. Slowly but surely, the
Supreme Court is adopting his preference for a flexible balancing
of interests under the rubric of due process.
Courts should not rigidly insist upon precise classifications, or
upon extraordinarily important governmental ends, when legislative line-drawing excludes individuals from a privilege that would
enhance their ability to exercise and enjoy fundamental rights. A
recent first amendment case, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,27 suggests that a flexible balancing approach is preferable to
strict scrutiny, because the rigidity of strict scrutiny hinders a
26. Chief Justice Stone perceived the conceptual error. "And so I think the

real question... is not one of equal protection, but whether the wholesale condennation of a class to such an invasion of personal liberty ... satisfies the demands of due process." Id. at 544 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Stone
probably was referring to procedural due process; the flaw in the statute which he
perceived was the inability of the individual to have "a hearing and opportunity to
challenge the existence as to him of the only facts which could justify so drastic a
measure." Id. From another viewpoint, perhaps Chief Justice Stone was trying to
say that the Oklahoma statute violated substantive due process because it did not
accord individuals their rights to procedural due process.
27. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).

more careful, particularized, case-by-case inquiry into the competing concerns of the government and the individual whose liberties are protected by the Constitution. A San Diego ordinance
was held unconstitutional on its face because it reached too far
into the realm of protected noncommercial speech. The ordinance imposed substantial prohibitions on the erection of outdoor
advertising signs in order to eliminate distracting hazards to
pedestrians and motorists and "to preserve and improve the appearance of the City." 28 Some exceptions to the general prohibition on outdoor advertising made the ban underinclusive to the
extent that it permitted signs that could be both ugly and distracting. The ban on noncommercial advertising was also overinclusive, owing to prohibitions on communication at places where
unsightly and distracting commercial signs could be erected.
None of the Justices applied the least discriminatory alternative
test, which is pro forma when classifications are subjected to
strict scrutiny. Instead of demanding more precise classifications,
the Justices analyzed the extent of the burden imposed on protected speech, and the strength of the government's interests.
Responsible balancing, which is an approach with "a capacity to
identify and evaluate separately each analytically distinct ingredient of the contending interests," 2 9 was a technique mastered by
Justice Harlan. It compares favorably with the "new" equal protection technique of the Warren era, which connotes "scrutiny
. . . 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." 30 We turn now to the development of the Court's "new" equal protection doctrine, which,
as applied, was more of a weapon than a tool of analysis.
28. Id. at 493.
29. See Gunther, supra note 18, at 1035.
30. G. GUNTHER, CON sTrruTONAL LAw: CASES AND MATEIALS 671 (10th ed.
1980), quoted in The Supreme Court; 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAhv. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972). There is a temptation, which has developed into a tendency, to
use equal protection principles in first amendment litigation. On the relationship
between the first amendment and the anti-discrimination thrust of the equal protection clause, see Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Karst, Equality as a CentralPrinciple in the First Amendment, 43 U. C-. L REV. 20 (1976).
Justice Stewart, however, joined the majority opinion in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455 (1980), on the understanding that the Court rested not ultimately on equal protection doctrine but on the first amendment: "[W~hat was actually at stake in
Mosely, and is at stake here, is the basic meaning of the constitutional protection

of free speech." Id. at 471 (concurring opinion). On the theme of the arguable inadequacies of the equal access principle in first amendment public forum cases,
see G. GUNTHER, supra, at 1196. For other commentary dealing with discrete
problems created by the apparent relationship between the equal protection
clauses and the content neutral requirements of the first amendment, see Alexander, supra note 20, at 54-55.

[VOL. 19: 737, 1982]

Due Process BalancingApproach
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

THE WARREN COURT'S "NEW" EQUAL PROTECTION

In Griffin v. Illinois,3 1 an indigent defendant convicted of a
crime could not afford to take full advantage of the one appeal to
which he was entitled because he was financially unable to
purchase a transcript of his trial. The state charged the same
transcript fee to every person who desired to appeal, but indi-

gents could not afford to pay the price. The Court held that Griffin had been denied equal protection and due process when the
state refused to furnish him a free transcript in order to perfect
his appeal. Justice Black's opinion stated:
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. See, e.g., McKane
v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-688. But that is not to say that a State that
does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates
against
32
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.

Equal protection of the laws calls for "procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations," 33 and in Justice
Black's view the state's system of charging a fee that indigents
could not afford was invidious. As he put it, "A State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion,
race or color because the ability to pay costs in advance bears no
34
rational relationship to a defendant's guilt."
To the extent Justice Black was relying on procedural due process principles 35 to support the Court's decision, he perhaps went
too far. No one was singled out and denied an appeal owing to
some alleged but disputed fact and for that reason deprived of an
opportunity to be heard. The state was treating all convicted defendants who wanted to appeal in the same way. Moreover, "the
transcript could be waived as a convenient but not necessary
36
predicate to court access."
Substantive due process principles were not violated because
31. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).

32. Id. at 18.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Id. at 17-18.
35. A trial transcript is obviously helpful to appeal errors made during the
course of a trial. But Griffin was not denied a transcript because of any trait peculiar to him or because of any alleged characteristics, action or tendency on his part
which was disputed. Since there were no facts in dispute which, if resolved, would
count against the state in the controversy over the transcript, the Court's reliance

on procedural due process principles is questionable.
36. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971) (construing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).

the state's practice of charging a uniform fee per page to cover its
costs, as Justice Harlan's dissent stated, is not "arbitrary or capricious." 37 A fee charged to all who wish to obtain the stenographic

minutes of a trial is hardly an irrational way for the state to obtain reimbursement for its expenses. Nor is the "failure to furnish free transcripts to indigents in all criminal cases ...
'shocking to the universal sense of justice.' ",38 Since the failure of
a state to provide for any appeal is not deemed shocking,39 Justice
Harlan was on firm ground when he said that the state did not violate the basic values of our society which give meaning to the
concept of due process of law.
Perhaps because the Court's procedural due process rationale
was tenuous, it also relied upon the equal protection clause. 40
The Court's reliance on a theory of equal protection was radical
because the state had not discriminated against anyone. It simply
charged a uniform fee. Justice Harlan argued that the Court was
in fact requiring the state to treat people unequally.4 1 Although
not intended malevolently, the state's uniform fee had a harsher
impact on those, who, owing to economic circumstances, could not
afford to pay the price. Justice Harlan, nevertheless, invoked the
Court's traditional concept of formal equality which "requires
merely that similar cases be treated similarly, 'according to one
and the same rule.'-42 The Griffin Court balked at such formal
equality.
The Court relied on a conception of proportional equality, taking account of each person's differing43 economic circumstances,
and requiring disparate treatment of individuals because of those
differences. This distinction between formal or numerical equality on the one hand, and proportional or substantive equality on
the other, was not discussed by the Court. Nor did the Court concede that it was ordering a modest redistribution of wealth. Justice Harlan submitted that the basis for the Court's holding was
simply its conclusion that the financial barrier confronting the indigent was fundamentally unfair.4 4 But this fundamental fairness
37. 351 U.S. 12, 37 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 39.
39. Id. at 18 (main opinion).
40. Id. at 16-19.
41. Id. at 34. "It may... be said that the real issue in this case is not whether
Illinois has discriminated but whether it has a duty to discriminate." Id. at 35
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. Developments, supra note 15, at 1163 (quoting Flathman, Equality and
Generalization,A FormalAnalysis, in EQuALITY: Nomos IX 38, 49 (1967).
43. Developments, supra note 15, at 1166.
44. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 38 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan argued that "the issue here is not the typical equal protection question of
the reasonableness of a 'classification' on the basis of which the State has imposed
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rationale, as Harlan later made clear, is simply substantive due
process doctrine masquerading in an equal protection costume.4 5
Undaunted, Justice Black stressed the state's discrimination
against the poor.46 But the state was not motivated by antipathy
toward the poor, nor had it intended to classify on the basis of economic status. The state treated rich and poor alike.
The indigent is always at a comparative disadvantage because
he is unable to afford the best criminail lawyer available. Stripped
of all the rhetoric about equality and discrimination, the crucial
question presented, therefore, was whether the state had an obligation to provide some minimal level of protection to help indigents who could not take meaningful advantage of the system of
appellate review.47 But the Court did not see (or did not want to
see) that this question pertains to substantive due process notions of fundamental fairness.
The effort to avoid a substantive due process rationale in Griffin
v. Illinois is explicable in light of the Court's post-1937 attempts
to avoid acting as a super-legislature. 6 The Court had often overturned state legislation that violated principles of fundamental
49
fairness emanating, it was said, from the due process clause.
But substantive due process doctrine was anathema to most of
the Warren Court Justices, 50 particularly Justice Black51 But
where the Warren Court had a will, it had a way. Justice Black's
way was to rely upon the equal protection clause. The fusing of
the equal protection and due process methodologies had begun.
The importance of Griffin lies in this curious development: The
Court recognized that an indigent's right to appeal is fundamental
only in connection with the equal protection clause, which is itlegal disabilities, but rather the reasonableness of the State's failure to remove
natural disabilities." Id. at 35-36.
45. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
46. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 n.10 (1956) (quoting Leviticus 19:15).
47. See also Michelman, The Supreme Cour(, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 passim
(1969).
48. See generally Miller, The Forestof Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional Tradition, in DuE PROCESS: Nomos XVIII 3 (1977).
49. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
50. See Gunther, supra note 30, at 42-43; see also McCloskey, Economic Due
Process and the Supreme Court:An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV.

34
51. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 392-94 (1971)

dissenting).

(Black, J.,

self not a source of fundamental rights, while expressly recognizing that the due process clause does not guarantee anyone, rich
52
or poor, the right to appeal a criminal conviction.
Griffin53 spawned a number of other cases guaranteeing the
"equal protection" rights of indigents accused of crime.54 One important sequel was Douglas v. California.55 An indigent defendant had unsuccessfully sought appointed counsel to represent
him on appeal (granted to all persons convicted of felonies in the
California courts). The Supreme Court held that California's refusal to provide attorneys at state expense denied equal protection of the law. The Court's rhetoric was powerful: 'There can be
no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.' -56 The state provided appointed counsel on occasion, but only when the appellate court
found after an investigation that "it would be helpful to the defendant or the court."5 7 This "gantlet of a preliminary showing of
merit" 58 did not satisfy the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas held
that, "Where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent
has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an
unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor."59
The state drew no lines. It was the Court that was involved in
line-drawing.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan contended that he
could find no violation of due process, procedural or substantive,
since the state may prevent the "needless expenditure of public
52. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
53. In Gr7ffln, the state granted convicted persons the right to appeal. Is the
policy of charging indigents for a transcript an undue burden on the right to appeal, which is a property right protected by the due process clause? The answer to
this question requires weighing the state's interest in covering its costs, against
the indigent's interests which are burdened. How the balance is struck requires
judgment. But the balancing of interests methodology is what distinguishes substantive due process doctrine from the rationality requirement of the equal protection clause which, properly understood, requires a tolerable relationship between
the challenged classification and the state's goal, but no balancing. In Griffin,
there is no doubt that the state's fee requirement was closely related to its goal to
obtain reimbursement for the court stenographer's minutes.
54. See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Williams v. Illinois,
399 U.S. 235 (1970); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); see also B. BRTuDNO, POVERTY, INEQUALI=Y AND THE LAw 45-68, 168-82 (1976). But see Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S.
226 (1971) (denial of transcript upheld because of available alternatives).
55. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
56. Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
57. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (quoting People v. Hyde, 51
Cal. 2d 152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958)).
58. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
59. Id.
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funds by summarily disposing of frivolous appeals." 60 That kind
of screening comports with the Supreme Court's own practice. 61
Justice Harlan again emphasized that the state is not required to
provide any appeal whatsoever. 6 2 The Court's rationale in Douglas was merely an extension of Griffn v. Illinois.63 But Justice
Harlan steadfastly opposed---on constitutional grounds-the leveling philosophy that was beginning to imbue the Warren Court

opinions.6
It was Justice Harlan's apprehension that Griffin could be extended far beyond the area of access to courts that induced him
to write:
Every financial exaction which the State imposes on a uniform basis is
more easily satisfied by the well-to-do than by the indigent. Yet I take it
that no one would dispute the constitutional power of the State to levy a
uniform sales tax, to charge tuition at a state university, to fix rates for the
purchase of water from a municipal corporation....
Laws such as these do not deny protection to the less fortunate for one
essential reason: the Equal Protection Clause does not impose on the
States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps flowing from differences
in economic circumstances. ' 65 To so construe it would be to read into the
Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be foreign to many of our
66
basic concepts of the proper relations between government and society.

Justice Harlan and the other Warren Court Justices, obviously
were at loggerheads on the theoretical question raised by Douglas and Griffin. That question was whether the rationale underlying the holdings should have rested on due process or on equal
protection principles or both. Justice Douglas relied primarily on
equal protection, 67 striving to label as suspect 68 classifications
having a harsher impact on the poor.69 His goal was never realized. 70 What remains peculiar, however, is that the interest in a
60. Id. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974).
62. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
64. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting his dissent in Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 34 (1956)).
66. Id. at 361-62.
67. Id. at 355-58 (main opinion).
68. See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
"And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are
drawn on the basis of wealth or race,.. . two factors which would independently
render a classification highly suspect ......

Id. at 807 (Warren, C.J.) (citation

omitted).
69. See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
70. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)

meaningful criminal appeal 71 is still deemed fundamental for
equal protection purposes,7 2 even though there is no due process
right to appeal a conviction.7 3
With the exception of Mr. Justice Douglas's opinion in Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,7 4 prior to the Warren era, the
equal protection clause was never deemed to be a source of fundamental rights. But lack of precedent did not inhibit the Warren
Court. The Justices recognized as fundamental not only the interest in a meaningful appeal in a criminal case (at least when the
75
state guarantees an appeal as of right) but also the right to vote,
the interest in meaningful access to the ballot,76 and the interest

in migrating with intent to settle in another state.77
What was unsettling was the Court's selection of fundamental
interests, regardless of constitutional text, legislative history, tradition, or any other source of values that is authentically rooted in
the Constitution. Moreover, the Court was almost smug7 8 in its
refusal to provide explanations, beyond misleading rhetoric about
equality,7 9 to justify its selections of certain liberties as fundamental. It manufactured the right to vote and the "one person,
one vote" standard out of whole cloth.8 0 The original Constitution
for the most part "appears to have treated voting rights as a matter solely of state concern and permitted the states wide tolerance
in deciding who could-and who could not-vote."8 1 It had never
been contemplated by the framers or suggested by any Justice
prior to the Warren era that durational residency requirements
which indirectly burden the right of interstate travel (arguably
protected by the commerce clause 82 and privileges and immuni(indigents seeking abortions from government were denied relief requested in

abortion funding controversies).
71. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
72. The question of what constitutes a meaningful appeal is a question of degree; it is not a question of fit between a state's classification and its goal. Therefore, in Ross v. Moffitt, id., the Court really analyzed the issue in a substantive due
process mode, although it retained the equal protection analysis applied to these

cases by Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
73. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
74. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
75. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
76. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
77. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
78. J. ELY, supra note 16, at 177.
79. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260-62 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result).
80. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81. B. NEU3ORNE & A. EISENBERG, THE RIGHTS OF CANDIDATES AND VoTERs 13

(rev. ed. 1980).
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 3.

[VOL. 19: 737, 1982]

Due Process BalancingApproach
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

ties clauses)8 3 violated the equal protection clause.8 4 As Professor Gunther wrote:
[I]t was the "fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that proved particularly dynamic, open-ended and amorphous: "It
was the element that bore the closest resemblance to the freewheeling
substantive due process, for it circumscribed legislative choices in the
name of newly articulated
85 values that lacked clear support in constitutional text and history."

But the mischief goes beyond freewheeling jurisprudence. The
modest virtue of the equal protection clause, deferentially applied, is that it need not disable any governmental body from
dealing with the problems that are of concern.88 When the rationality requirement of the equal protection clause is violated, the
government merely has to broaden or narrow the scope of the invalidated classifications. The "new" equal protection of the War87
ren Court, because it really focused on fundamental interests,
had a greater tendency to prevent the government from regulating activities that, according to the legislature, required
regulation.88
It was this "new" fundamental rights ingredient of the equal
protection clause that caused Justice Harlan to elaborate his
views in Shapiro v. Thompson.8 9 The Court struck down a oneyear residency requirement for welfare benefits on the ground
that the waiting period impinged on the constitutional right of interstate travel. Justice Brennan, writing the opinion for the
Court, did not bother "to ascribe the source of this right.., to a
particular constitutional provision."90 Nevertheless, he cited
83. Id. amend. XIV, § 1; art. IV, § 2.
84. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 666-71 (1969) (Harlan, J., dis-

senting).
85. G. GuNTHER, supra note 30, at 671-72, quoted in The Supreme Court 1971

Term, supra note 30, at 8.
86. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660-61 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

87. As Professor Perry described the oddity:
Under the so-called "fundamental interests" strand of equal protection

doctrine,.. . [wihat is disfavored is not the basis of the classification (i.e.,
the trait or other factor in terms of which the class is defined) but its effect
(preventing or impeding satisfaction of a fundamental interest). If the

problem is the effect of the classification, however, does it make sense to
conceptualize the problem in terms of equal protection?
Perry, supra note 19, at 1077.
88. See Lupu, supra note 19, at 994.
89. 394 U.S. 618, 655-77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

90. Id. at 630 (main opinion) (footnote omitted).

United States v. Guest,9 ' decided three years earlier, to hold that
the right to travel "occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union." 92 Accordingly, he rejected the state's
"argument that a mere showing of a rational relationship between
the waiting period and ... four admittedly permissible state
objectives will suffice to justify the classification." 93 Instead, he
wrote:
Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of

whether it promotes a compelling state interest. Under this standard, the
94
waiting-period requirement clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The waiting period requirement, of course, had the effect of classifying needy people on the basis of the time they had resided in
the state.95 But durational residency requirements are not directed at "discrete and insular minorities" 96 against which there
is a "special animus." 97 Thus, it seems anomalous to scrutinize
strictly the burdening of the "right to travel" under equal protection principles. 9 8 Justice Harlan suggested that it was unsound to
enlarge the list of cases that trigger the compelling interest standard "to include classifications based upon recent interstate
movement, and perhaps those based upon the exercise of any
constitutional right."99
When a state's classification impinges on a right guaranteed by
the Constitution, Justice Harlan pointed out, "there is no need for
any resort to the Equal Protection Clause; in such instances, this
Court may properly and straightforwardly invalidate any undue
burden upon those rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause."oo But the Court's recent pattern, Harlan
91.
92.
Guest,
93.
94.

383 U.S. 745 (1966).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) (quoting United States v.
383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 638 (emphasis on word "touches" added). The Court's use of the

compelling interest standard can be viewed in either of two ways: (1) The Court

did not accept the state's articulated objectives at face value, and assumed that
they were pretexts designed to conceal impermissible aims (i.e., deterring needy

persons from entering the state); or (2) the articulated goals were not of such

overriding importance to outweigh the disadvantaged class members' interest in

welfare benefits. If alternative (1) is applicable, placing the burden on the state to
show that its articulated aims are not pretexts is too heavy-handed, absent the

existence of a suspect classification. If alternative (2) is applicable, the Court was
balancing pursuant to a substantive due process balancing approach; therefore, it
was unnecessary, as well as misleading, to describe its analysis in equal protection terms.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 627.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979).
Note, supra note 3, at 538.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 659.
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complained, was to apply the "compelling interest" test of strict
scrutiny in order to protect fundamental interests not guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution and regardless of the rational basis
for the state's classification. Justice Harlan believed that the
Court lacked authority to proceed deceptively in this mode.' 0 '
Justice Harlan accurately traced the genesis of the Court's

"new" equal protection back to Skinner v. Oklahoma.l02 The deci-

sional method had surfaced, he noted, "[a]fter a long hiatus...
in Reynolds v. Sirn,1o3... in which state apportionment statutes
were subjected to an unusually stringent test [of numerical
equality-one person, one vote] because 'any alleged infringe-

ment of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.' "104 The "new" equal protection had emerged
again in Harperv. Virginia Board of Elections'0 5 and in other voting.rights cases. The trend continued in Shapiro v. Thompson.

Justice Harlan thought this open-ended branch of equal protection doctrine was "particularly unfortunate ... because it creates
an exception which threatens to swallow the standard equal protection rule,"' 06 and he knew "of nothing which entitles this Court
to pick out particular human activities, characterize them as 'fundamental' and give them added protection under an unusually
7
stringent equal protection test.' 10
101. Id. at 658-63.

102. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
103. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
104. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 660 (1969)

(Harlan, J., dissenting)

(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)).
105. 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (Texas
statute denying certain servicemen in the armed forces the vote invalidated under
strict scrutiny).
106. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 662. The privileges and immunities clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl.
1, protects a resident of state A who travels into state B. But the applicant for welfare is a resident of state B, not a sojourner; he or she is simply ineligible for welfare. The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment has been
virtually a dead letter since the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873), and it is really something of a cheat to rely on the negative implications of
the commerce clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, as a source of fundamental
rights. The Court in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966), however, did
hold that the "freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution," and, therefore, the right of interstate travel is arguably protected by the fifth amendment of the Federal
Constitution. But, if it is protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment and is burdened by a state statute, the proper mode of analysis must be substantive due process, not equal protection.
One problem with the "compelling interest" test of the equal protection clause is

The proper approach, Justice Harlan submitted, was to weigh
the competing interests pursuant to the due process clause. 0 8
Justice Harlan, after balancing, could not conclude "that the burden imposed by residence requirements upon ability to travel
outweighs the governmental interests." 0 9
Justice Harlan's position was partially vindicated last Term in
Jones v. Helms"10 when the Court intimated that cases like Shapiro should be decided directly on right to travel grounds without
triggering the kind of strict scrutiny that is typical of the "new"
equal protection analysis.
Justice Stewart concurred in Shapiro v. Thompson, and to him
it did not seem to matter much whether the challenged statute
was tested "against the Equal Protection Clause ...

or... tested

against the Due Process Clause.""'l Justice Stewart later changed
its rigidity. It is too strict if it is triggered each time a durational residency requirement touches upon the fundamental interest in interstate travel. Accordingly, the Court clarified the nature of this fundamental interest as the right to
migrate "with intent to settle and abide." Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250, 255 (1974) (footnote omitted).
108. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 671, 674-77 (1969).

109. Id. at 677.
110. 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
111. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 644 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). In
1973, Justice Stewart was the moving force behind the renewal of interest in irrebuttable presumption analysis. For example, in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973), the Court invalidated a state's tuition preference for bona fide residents,
which turned, in part, on a durational residency requirement for unmarried students. Justice Stewart concluded that where a state "purport[s] to be concerned
with residency," id. at 452, the due process clause is violated if an individual is denied "the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption
of nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in
fact." Id. Justice Stewart wrote that due process requires "the State [to] allow
such an individual the opportunity to present evidence showing that he is a bona
fide resident entitled to the in-state rates." Id. This was means scrutiny with a
vengeance, for it required an absolutely perfect nexus between the challenged
classification and the state's purpose.
The applicability of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was limited drastically by the Court in Weinberger v. Salfl, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). The Court upheld a
statutory classification that pertained to certain Social Security Act eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. The
challenged statutory classification (which is usually the case) was not universally
true. Justice Rehnquist, however, wrote that there is "no basis for our requiring
individualized determinations when Congress can rationally conclude not only
that generalized rules are appropriate to its purposes and concerns, but also that
the difficulties of individual determinations outweigh the marginal increments in
the precise effectuation of congressional concern which they might be expected to
produce." Id. at 785. Justice Stewart joined the opinion without comment.
The irrebuttable presumption approach has not yet been rejected in cases
where fundamental interests are substantially burdened. See Elkins v. Moreno,
435 U.S. 647, 660 (1978). This approach is obviously just as strict as the "new"
equal protection, and it will be necessary for the Court to adopt a more careful
balancing test if it is to avoid going from the frying pan of the "new" equal protection into the fire of the irrebutable presumption doctrine. The challenger of an ir-
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his mind." 2 But the Warren Court continued to rely upon the
equal protection clause, despite disclaimers, to conceal its zeal for
displacing the legislative judgment with its own views of wise social and economic policy."3
THE BURGER COURT

In 1970, Chief Justice Warren Burger assigned himself the opinion writing duty in Williams v. l7linois." 4 Williams had been convicted of petty theft and received the maximum sentence
provided by state law: one year imprisonment and a $500 fine." 5
The state court judgment directed, as permitted by statute, that if
Williams had not paid his fine and court costs by the date set for
his release, he would have to remain in jail "to 'Work off' the monetary obligations at the rate of $5 per day."" 6 Williams argued
that "every instance of default imprisonment violates either the
Equal Protection and/or Due Process Clause(s) of the Fourteenth
Amendment."" 7 The Illinois Supreme Court held that "there is
no denial of equal protection of the law when an indigent defendrebuttable presumption should have the burden of persuasion to show that a
fundamental interest of constitutional significance has been substantially burdened by a statutory presumption. If such a showing is made, then the Court
should balance the competing concerns to determine what kind of individualized
hearing, if any, is required by the due process clause. In this situation it is difficult to make a conceptual distinction between substantive and procedural due process issues, which, if resolved in favor of the challenger, requires a procedural due
process remedy.
112. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 391 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Redhail, Justice Stewart stated, 'To
hold, as the Court does, that the Wisconsin statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause seems to me to misconceive the meaning of that constitutional guarantee.
The Equal Protection Clause deals not with substantive rights or freedoms but
with invidiously discriminatory classifications." Id. Stewart added:
The Court is understandably reluctant to rely on substantive due process. But to embrace the essence of that doctrine under the guise of equal
protection serves no purpose but obfuscation. "[Clouched in slogans and
ringing phrases," the Court's equal protection doctrine shifts the focus of
the judicial inquiry away from its proper concerns....
Id. at 395-96 (citations omitted).
113. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("'compelling interest' rule ... [goes] far toward making this Court a 'superlegislature"').
114. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
115. Id. at 236.
116. Id. (footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 238 n.7.

ant is imprisoned to satisfy payment of a fine."118 The United
States Supreme Court reversed.
Previous Supreme Court decisions had tacitly approved of incarceration as a means to "work off" unpaid fines.11 9 But Chief
Justice Burger relied on Griffin v. Illinois and quoted Justice
Black's language that "a law nondiscriminatory on its face may be
grossly discriminatory in its operation.' 20 The Court held that
"the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any
substantive offense be the same for all defendants irrespective of
their economic status."'21
Justice Harlan concurred in the result. Viewing the case as a
"due process matter,' 22 he determined that legislation which de23
prives an individual of his liberty, "his right to remain free,"'
outweighs the state's penological interests, given the existence of
less burdensome alternatives.124 Justice Harlan, however, continued to adhere to his previously stated views criticizing the "new"
equal protection.125 Except for Justice Harlan, all the Warren
Court holdovers joined in the Chief Justice's equal protection
opinion. By 1970, equal protection had become the preferred technique to review alleged invidious discrimination against indigents. Chief Justice Burger was either not ready or not able to
disturb the established precedent.
Fortunately, Justice Harlan had the opportunity to write the
Court's opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut.12 6 This was a class action brought by indigent welfare recipients who unsuccessfully
tried to file divorce actions in state courts but could not "pay
either the court fees required by statute or the cost incurred for
the service of process."' 27 Simply by reason of their indigency,
many individuals were denied access to the state's divorce
courts. 128 Justice Harlan relied on the procedural due process

cases which require "at a minimum, that absent a countervailing
state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle
118. Id. at 238 (quoting People v. Williams, 41 Ill. 2d 511, 517, 244 N.E.2d 197, 200
(1969) (footnote omitted)).
119. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240 (1970) (citing Hill v. United States ex
rel. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460 (1936); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878)).
120. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970) (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956)).
121. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244 (1970).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 264-66.
Id. at 259.
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Id. at 372.
Id. at 374.
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their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must
be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard." 129 But Justice
Harlan was careful to limit the scope of his decision. Aside from
the fact that payment of the fees was a necessary predicate to
court access 130 and that access to the divorce courts is the only
way to adjust "a fundamental human relationship,"'13 Harlan emphasized that in more than one due process case "this Court...
recognized [that] marriage involves interests of basic importance
in our society." 3 2 Justice Harlan did not imply that marriage is a
fundamental right which always triggers strict scrutiny and the
compelling interest test. His enduring message is that the Court
must squint hard when a state, absent "a sufficient countervailing
justification,"133 denies indigents "their claimed right to a dissolution of their marriages."134 In short, Justice Harlan was advocating a flexible, careful balancing of interests approach instead of
the rigid and usually fatal compelling interest test which is typical
of the "new" equal protection. Justice Harlan's due process approach was recently emulated by the Court in Little v. Streater'3 5
which held, after balancing, that an indigent defendant in a paternity action was entitled to blood grouping tests at state expense.
During the early 1970's, the Burger Court travelled on the same
equal protection road mapped out by its predecessor-sometimes
backwards. There had been widespread speculation that welfare,
housing, and education would be recognized as fundamental
"new" equal protection interests that trigger strict scrutiny.13 6
These possibilities never materialized. The Court in San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez 3 7 made it plain that it is
no longer "the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection." 138
In Rodriguez, the Court vowed to confine its discoveries of fundamental rights to those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
3 9
Constitution."
129. Id. at 377.
130. Id. at 382-83.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 376.
133. Id. at 380-81.

134. Id. at 380.
135. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
136. See G. GuRTHEn, supra note 30, at 8-9, and sources cited.

137. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
138. Id. at 33.

139. Id. at 33-34.

For the most part, the Burger Court's discoveries of fundamental interests have been based on the due process clause. The one
notable exception is Zablocki v. Redhail,140 where the Burger
Court apparently confirmed as "fundamental" the freedom to decide whether or not to marry. The Court invalidated a state statute which required a resident to obtain court permission to
marry, if he were subject to a court order to support minor children not in his custody. After a "critical examination,"141 because
the right to marry was "fundamental," the Court held that the
statute violated the equal protection clause. The problem in holding that "all regulation touching upon marriage implicates a 'fun42
damental right' triggering the most exacting judicial scrutiny"'
was the topic of the separate concurrences of Justices Powell' 4 3
and Stevens. 4 4 Justice Powell explained that the Court's approach "would cast doubt on the network of restrictions that the
States have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce."145 If the
Court were to apply its most exacting equal protection scrutiny,

hardly any restrictions pertaining to the right to marry would survive. This lethal scrutiny would not be triggered if the more flexible due process balancing approach of Justice Harlan were used
to review state restrictions on marriage.
Only Justice Stewart took the trouble to point out that the
Court's decision in Redhail, which was based solely on equal protection principles, "is no more than substantive due process by
another name."' 46 He explained that the effect of the Court's
holding was not to require the state "to draw its legislative classifications with greater precision or to afford similar treatment to
similarly situated persons"' 47 which is the function of equal protection. What the Court actually accomplished, Stewart pointed
out, was to restrict the "basic governmental power"'14 to regulate
marriage as it pleases, which is the "heart of substantive due process"' 49 doctrine. Justice Stewart justly complained that the
Court's embrace of substantive due process "under the guise of
equal protection serves no purpose but obfuscation."l50
The Court's obfuscation has not gone unnoticed by law review
140. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
141. Id. at 383 (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 396-403.
Id. at 403-06 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 399 (PoweU, J., concurring).
Id. at 395 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 395-96.
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commentators. Professor Lupu has observed that the Court's frequent but inconsistent use of the equal protection clause as its
authority to protect fundamental rights entangles liberty and
equality as constitutional ideals.' 5 ' This tangle, Lupu notes, raises
several questions: "Which new rights properly derive from the
liberty strand, and which from the equality strand? Sometimes
the Court tells us; other times it does not." 5 2 Lupu, like Justice
Harlan and later Justice Stewart, argues that "the equality strand
cannot and should not bear a substantive content-that equal protection, whether viewed in moral terms or process terms, should
remain substantially rooted in the pure antidiscrimination con53
cerns that... inspired the framers."
The tangling of the strands was quite evident in Maher v.
Roe.1 54 At issue was the constitutionality of a state's policy which
permitted the use of Medicaid funds to reimburse a woman for
the costs of childbirth and "medically necessary" abortions. The
state, however, did not reimburse women for nontherapeutic
abortions. The due process question presented was "whether the
Constitution, after Roe v. Wade, affIrmatively requires state subsidy of abortions for women too poor to bear the cost privately." 5 5 The Court's analysis, however, "followed an equal
protection mode,Ul5 6 although Justice Powell, in his effort to avoid
requiring the state to "show a compelling interest for its policy
choice to favor normal childbirth,"57 did examine the nature of
the fundamental right identified in Roe v. Wade. 5 8 The awkwardness of this approach suggests that the strands which the Court
has used to weave equal protection and due process principles
into a blurred pattern ought to be untangled.
Maher v. Roe is an important milestone back down the road
mapped out by the Warren Court, because the Court rejected
quite clearly the proportional equality concept that inspired Griffin v. Illinois.5 9 There were, to be sure, many other cases de151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Lupu, supra note 19, at 983; see also Note, supra note 3, at 529.
Lupu, supra note 19, at 984 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 985.
432 U.S. 464 (1977).
Lupu, supra note 19, at 1003 (footnote omitted).
G. GUNTER, supra note 30, at 618.

157. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977).
158. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

159. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Justice Powell distinguished Grzffin on the grounds that
the case is grounded "in the criminal justice system, a governmental monopoly in
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cided before the Maher decision which refused to build on the
tantalizing Warren Court dicta suggesting the prospect of strict
scrutiny for all classifications affecting the basic necessities of
life. 160 In Dandridgev. Williams161 and Lindsey v. Normet,1 62 for
example, the Court applied its most deferential rational basis test
when statutes, which had the effect of denying indigents welfare
and housing, were challenged. The Court made it clear that welfare 163 and housing,164 however important, were not fundamental
rights; neither was education.165 Moreover, in United States v.
Kras166 and Ortwein v. Schwab,167 indigents who respectively
were too poor to file for voluntary bankruptcy and without funds
to appeal a denial of welfare benefits were without constitutional
remedies. The Court explained that the right to bankruptcy is not
fundamental,168 and the interest in welfare payments has far less
constitutional significance than the fundamental rights recognized
70
in the "privacy"169 cases.
which participation is compelled." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 n.6 (1977). Moreover, he stated that "[b]ecause Connecticut has made no attempt to monopolize
the means for terminating pregnancies through abortion the present case is easily
distinguishable from Boddie [v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)]." Id. at 469-70
n.5.
160. See Gunther, supra note 30, at 9, and sources cited.
161. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
162. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
163. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
164. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
165. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
There are at least two ways of looking at these cases. Through the equal protection prism, one could say that the legislature did not intend to burden the poor,
and that any burdens imposed were in spite of, not because of, government policy.
Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). Another prism,
more typical of the "new" equal protection, is to inquire whether the burdened interest is fundamental. Housing, education and welfare, however important, are
not deemed related to the enduring basic values of our society. Had the nexus
theory of Justice Marshall, articulated in his dissent in San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973), been adopted, the Court could
have continued using the equal protection clause as a source of substantive rights
not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court rejected the
nexus theory, id. at 35-37, and is now beginning to analyze the issues presented by
social legislation in the mode of substantive due process doctrine which is the
traditional source for identifying basic values. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
166. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
167. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
168. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).
169. What distinguishes Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), from United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), is
that welfare and bankruptcy, however important, are privileges which the government is free to grant or withhold as it pleases. Boddie, however, involved the interests in dissolving a marriage which is an institution that relates to the basic
values that underlie our society. The government has less leeway to be arbitrary
when its policy runs counter to basic values. But the discovery of basic values in-
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In Maherv. Roe171 the question presented was whether a state's
financial pressure, albeit in the form of a carrot rather than a
stick, forces a female to forego her fundamental right to an abortion. The state's selective funding made the indigent's right to
have a medically supervised nontherapeutic abortion meaningless
as a practical matter. But the Court held that the financial pressure which encourages childbirth is not a state-created obstacle
which blocks the "pregnant woman's path to an abortion."' 72
Thus, unlike Griffin v. Illinois7 3 and Douglas v. California,?4
the Court imposed no affirmative duty upon the state to "lift
the handicaps flowing from differences in economic circumstances." 7 5
Although the issue in Maher v. Roe 176 primarily involved clarification of the liberty identified in Roe v. Wade,177 the Court analyzed it as an equal protection question, and since the Court
already had held in Wade that the interest in preserving the potential of human life is not necessarily compelling,178 the government's case seemed weak. But although the Court appeared to
proceed in an equal protection mode, it held that constitutionally
protected interests were not invaded, 179 since the failure of the
state to subsidize all abortions was not an "unduly burdensome
interference with [the] freedom to decide whether to terminate
...

pregnancy."' 8 0 The Court's "undue burden" terminology re-

lates not to classifications but to liberty. From this terminology, I
discern a signal for retreat from the rigidity of the "new" equal
protection technique.
volves the kind of judgment which typifies the Court's substantive due process
approach.
170. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973); see also Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (due process does not require the appointment of
counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding).
171. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
172. Id. at 474.
173. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
174. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
175. Griffin v. Illnois, 351 U.S. 12, 34 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
176. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
177. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. Id. at 163-65.
179. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
180. Id. The Court indicated that the government action was not the proximate
cause of the burden on the individual's liberty in the "but for" sense. In other

words, absent the government action, the indigent would still be unable to obtain
a medically supervised abortion free of charge.

Even before Maher v. Roe, the Burger Court has been retreating in somewhat disorganized fashion from the path the Warren
Court had cleared. In Ross v. Moffitt,181 for example, the Court refused to extend the principles enunciated in Douglas v. California 82 to discretionary appeals. Although conceding that lawyers
can be helpful to indigents pursuing discretionary appeals, the
Court held that the need of an indigent for a lawyer to brief and
argue a discretionary appeal (after losirig the first appeal as of
right) is not a handicap great enough to impose upon the state
any further obligation to subsidize the litigation.183 Although
Douglasv. Californiarequired the state to provide indigents with
a "meaningful appeal,"184 Justice Rehnquist found that the question is "one of degrees." 8 5 This flexible approach captures the essence of due process balancing. 186
In Sosna v. Iowa, 8

7

the Court held that a state's durational

residency requirement did not violate the rights of persons seeking quick divorces. Such persons were not "irretrievably foreclosed"188 from obtaining the divorces they sought. The question
was whether the challenged durational residence requirement
was reasonable under the circumstances.189 The Court explained
that the burden on liberty created by the requisite temporary
waiting period was not substantial enough to outweigh the state's
interests in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decrees to collateral attack.190 This kind of flexible balancing is not
possible under the rigid and lethal standard applied in Shapiro v.
Thompson.191
Thus, in the name of the equal protection clause, the Burger
Court has been balancing. But during the early seventies the
meld of due process and equal protection principles remained basically intact, creating the misleading impression that they were
not conceptually distinct.
In a substantive due process case, even when the challengers'
constitutionally protected interest is "of basic importance in our
181. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).

182. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
183. Ross v. Moffltt, 417 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1974).

184. Id. at 612 (quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963)).
185. Id.

186. See also Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). The Court upheld a 50-day
durational residency requirement in a right-to-vote case and adopted a level of
scrutiny which was a far cry from Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), though
similar to a flexible due process balancing approach.
187. 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
188. Id. at 406.
189. Note, supra note 3, at 539.
190. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407-08 (1975).
191. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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society,"192 the Court should not impose a virtually impossible
burden of persuasion on the state. There was another indication
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland 9 3 that Justice Harlan's technique of sensitively balancing the relevant competing interests
has appeal for some of the Justices.194 The Court invalidated a
city's zoning ordinance which limited the occupancy of a dwelling
unit to members of a single family and defined "family" in such a
way that a grandmother could not share her home with her grandson without violating the ordinance.195 Justice Powell's plurality
opinion carefully examined "the importance of the governmental
interests advanced to justify the ordinance and the extent to
which they were served by the challenged regulation." 9 6 He did
not apply the compelling interest test and did not place any extraordinarily heavy burden of persuasion on the city; nor did he
insist upon the least restrictive alternative test, although he held
that the city's restriction "has but a tenuous relation"197 -to its legitimate goals. Eschewing rigid and insensitively strict formulas
of scrutiny, he quoted Justice Harlan's eloquent dissent in Poe v.
Ullman:198
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that
through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance
which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized
society.... No formula could serve as a substitute ... for judgment and
restraint. 1 9 9

Justice Powell's approach in Moore is preferable to the "new"
equal protection in this respect. Rather than utilizing the equal
protection clause as a source of fundamental interests, he relied
on precedent and tradition to identify the basic enduring values
in our society which were deemed to encompass the "constitutional right to live together as a family."200 The plurality opinion
adopted a flexible balancing approach, which was sensitive both
to the interests of the government and the individual whose lib192. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).

193. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
194. See id. at 496 rL1.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id.
367

at 496 n.2, 497.
at 499.
at 500.
U.S. 497 (1961).

199. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)).

200. 431 U.S. at 500.

erty was burdened. The Court, however, gave no clear signal that
the "new" equal protection was no longer a viable technique; instead, Justice Powell merely indicated in a footnote that there
was no need to reach the equal protection question presented by
201
the case.
In Harris v. McRae, 202 the Court stressed the point that the
threshold and crucial question in an abortion funding case pertains to the liberty203 identified in Roe v. Wade.2 04 After Justice
Stewart noted that the guarantees of equal protection are not a
source of substantive rights 205 (save for the exception identified
in Reynolds v. Sims206), he applied the minimum rationality level
of review, 207 because no challenged classification discriminated
against discrete and insular minorities 20 8 and because the state's
financial pressure on pregnant females did not violate the due
process clause.209 Thus, a majority of the Justices in Harrisv. McRae2 10 focused on the difference between equal protection principles and substantive due process doctrine. Assuming the Burger
Court continues to adhere to its approach in McRae, the rigid
compelling interest test of the "new" equal protection will be inapplicable if the challenged government action does not violate
2 11
due process of law.
H.L. v. Matheson2 12 strengthens the thesis that the Court is
abandoning the "new" equal protection concept for a more flexible due process balancing approach. The plaintiff, a fifteen year
old girl, was pregnant. She did not wish to inform her parents,
with whom she lived, of her condition. Her physician advised her
that an abortion would be in her best medical interest, 21 3 but "he
could not and would not perform the abortion, without first notifying her parents." 2 14 The Utah criminal code 215 requires a physi201. Id. at 496 n.3.
202. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

203. Id. at 312.
204. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
205. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980).
206. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Justice Stewart noted, "Reynolds held that if a State
adopts an electoral system, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon a qualified voter a substantive right to participate in the electoral process equally with other qualified voters." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322
n.25 (1980).

207. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-26 (1980).
208. Id. at 322.
209. Id. at 317.
210. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
211. See id. at 322. ("The guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a source of substantive rights or liberties. . .
212.
213.
214.
215.

450 U.S. 398 (1981).
Id. at 400.
H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 908 (Utah 1979), aff'd 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-7-304(2) (1974).
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cian "if it is physically possible"216 to notify the "parents or
guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be per217
formed if she is a minor."
Plaintiff proceeded to assert her rights in a class action seeking
to represent "a class consisting of unmarried 'minor women who
are suffering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the
pregnancies but may not do so' because of their physicians' insistence on complying with 76-7-304(2)."218 After a hearing, the trial
judge dismissed the complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory
relief.2 19 The issue, as framed by the Utah Supreme Court, was
"whether the statute serves 'any significant state interest' that is
not present in the case of an adult, which would justify as a condition precedent to the obtaining of an abortion by a minor, the notification of her parents. 22 0
The Utah Supreme Court resolved the issue in favor of the
state. The court focused its scrutiny-which was hardly strict-on
the state's special interest in encouraging an unmarried pregnant
minor to seek the advice of her parents in making the important
decision as to whether or not to bear a child. It held "[t] here is
no basis to conclude this provision unduly burdens the constitutional right of the minor woman ....
,"221 The state court did not
discuss the equal protection clause.
The Supreme Court affirnmed in a six to three decision. Although the Utah courts did not narrowly construe the challenged
statute to avoid a facial overbreadth challenge, the Court held
that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert the rights of all unmarried mature or emancipated minors. 222 In what has to be characterized as a flexible ad hoc balancing approach, the Chief Justice
wrote that the challenged statute "gives neither parents nor
judges a veto power over the minor's abortion decision ...
[and]
[a]s applied to immature and dependent minors ...
plainly
serves the important considerations of family integrity and pro216.
217.
218.
219.

H- L- v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 404 (1981).
Id. at 400 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1974)).
H- L- v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 401 (1981).
H- L- v. Matheson, 604 P.2d 907, 907-08 (Utah 1979), aff'd 450 U.S. 398

(1981).
220. 604 P.2d at 912.
221. Id.
222. H- L- v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 406 (1981).

tecting adolescents." 223 He added that "the Utah statute is reasonably calculated to protect minors in appellant's class by
enhancing the potential for parental consultation concerning a decision that has potentially traumatic and permanent consequences. 2 24 The Court did not deny that the statute burdens
fundamental rights but noted:
That the requirement of notice to parents may inhibit some minors from
seeldng abortions is not a valid basis to void the statute as applied to appellant ....

The Constitution does not compel a State to fine-tune its

statutes so as to encourage or facilitate abortions. To the contrary, state
action "encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances"
is "rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life."22 5

The Court rejected the contention that abortions were being
singled out for special treatment in contrast to other medical pro22 6
cedures, like childbirth, that do not require parental notice.
The Court held, the equal protection clause notwithstanding, that
"a State's interest in full-term pregnancies is sufficiently different
to justify the line drawn by the statutes." 22 7 The Court imposed
no heavy burden of persuasion upon the state to show that the
medical decision to carry an unwanted fetus to term carries less
risk of harm to the pregnant female than an abortion. Indeed, the
state presented no evidence that the Court cited to justify the absence of a provision requiring the treating physician to inform
parents that their child (his patient) is pregnant and has elected
to carry the fetus to term. The Court, nevertheless, assumed that
"[i]f the pregnant girl elects to carry her [unwanted] child to
term [rather than notify her parents of an election to abort], the
medical decisions to be made entail few-perhaps none-of the
potentially grave emotional and psychological consequences of
the decision to abort."22 8 In short, at least with respect to the minor's fundamental right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, if the due process clause is not violated, there is
apparently no longer a rigid, strict scrutiny of the state's classifications. Thus, the "new" equal protection concept of the Warren
Court seems to have lost its appeal for the Burger Court.
Chief Justice Burger did not mention, even in passing, the
"compelling interest" standard. Nor did Justice Powell, who
stressed the flexibility of his due process analysis. "Numerous
and significant interests compete when a minor decides whether
223. Id. at 411 (footnotes omitted).

224. Id. at 412 (footnotes omitted).
225. Id. (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
226. Id.
227. Id.

228. Id. at 412-13.
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or not to abort her pregnancy

...

None of these interests is ab-

solute. Even an adult woman's right to an abortion is not unqualified."22 9 For further emphasis, Justice Powell wrote:
The circumstances relevant to the abortion decision by a minor can and
do vary so substantially that absolute rules-requiring parental notice in
all cases or in none-would create an inflexibility that often would allow
for no consideration of the rights and interests [of the parents and
state] 23o

Justice Stevens also counselled flexibility:
The fact that a state statute may have some impact upon a minor's exercise of his or her rights begins, rather than ends, the constitutional inquiry. Once the statute's impact is identified,
it must be evaluated in light
2 31
of the state interest underlying the statute.

As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent, "The decision of the
Court is narrow."2 32 The decision might be explicable on the
ground that a minor was involved-which traditionally dilutes the
Court's level of scrutiny.2 33 Furthermore, the Court did not unambiguously concede that the fundamental right of the plaintiff was
substantially burdened; thus, the Court has not yet explicitly disavowed the Waren Court's doctrinal legacy. The Court, nevertheless, is obviously heeding Justice Harlan's admonition not to
use strict scrutiny mechanically each time human activities characterized as fundamental are affected in order to "give them added protection under an unusually stringent equal protection
test."23 4 Thus, from the perspective of constitutional theory, the
tangled strands of equal protection and due process are in the
process of being separated. The movement in this direction is
gaining momentum. It would be a welcome development if never
229. Id. at 418-19 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154
(1973)).
230. Id. at 420 (footnote omitted).
231. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 425. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, stressed in his concurring opinion that the decision leaves open the question of whether the statute
"unconstitutionally burdens the right of a mature minor or a minor whose best interests would not be served by parental notification." Id. at 414.
233. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979), Justice Powell -wrote, "The
Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the law is unique in
many respects." He also explained that, 'The unique role in our society of the
family, the institution by which 'we inculcate and pass down many of our most
cherished values, moral and cultural,' requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children."
Id. at 634 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
234. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

the twain shall meet again.235
More than sterile preferences for verbal nuances or symmetry
are at stake. The confusion generated by"the Warren Court's odd
marriage of equal protection and due process principles places
too heavy a burden of persuasion on the state in the "new" equal
protection cases. This is a perversion of the equal protection
clause. Absent a suspect or disfavored classification, the rationality requirement is the essence of equal protection doctrine. It is
the test in the great majority of cases which do not involve suspicious classifications that trigger either the strict or the intermediate level of scrutiny. Although enforcing the requirement of a
reasonable classification involves judgment, it does not involve an
evaluation of the importance of legislative ends. 236 A classifica-

tion is either overinclusive or underinclusive, or it is not. The
only burden on the state, at most, is the plausible articulation of
its ends and the reasons that justify its classification.2 3 7
Justice Marshall opposes across the board application of the rationality requirement. His concept of the sliding scale permits
the Court to balance in a wide variety of equal protection cases
depending on its view of the importance of the individual's interest which is burdened and the relative suspiciousness of the classification which is challenged. In Justice Marshall's words,
We must consider the substantiality of the state interests to be served,
and we must scrutinize the reasonableness of the means by which the
State has sought to advance its interests. Differences in the application of
this test are, in my view, a function of the constitutional importance of the
2 38

interests at stake and the invidiousness of the particular

classifications.

The Court has not adopted this approach in the equal protection
cases, probably because Marshall's sliding scale is not limited to
interests that would, if burdened, justify heightened scrutiny.
Justice Marshall's sliding scale appears to be an interest balancing approach that blurs the differences "between the equal
235. "Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall

meet. ...

Rudyard Kipling, the Ballad
of East and West.

The affinity is understandable.
"[A] mastiff dog
May love a puppy cur for no more
reason
Than the twain have been tied up
together .....
"
Alfred, Lord Tennyson
Queen Mary, act I, scene IV.
236. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 42-43.
237. See id. at 46-47.
238. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 124 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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protection and the due process methods of review."23 9 An endsoriented sliding scale, to the extent it is limited to interests with
constitutional significance, is an unnecessary addition to the
equal protection clause if the Court adheres to the substantive
due process methodology of Justice Harlan. In the words of Justice Harlan (reiterated in Zablocki v. Redhai24O by Justice Stewart) the Court's focus is on
the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and

purpose, the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose,
and the degree of confidence we may have that the statute reflects the legislative concern for the purpose that would legitimately support the
means chosen.24 1
Justice Harlan believed that a frank recognition of the Court's
power under the interests balancing approach pursuant to substantive due process principles would lead to more self-discipline, 24 2 which is often absent if the Court is preoccupied with
"equalizing" rather than with analyzing the rationality of the legislative enactment in relation to legislative purpose. 243 The Court
in Harrisv. McRae was clearly not preoccupied with "equalizing."
CONCLUSION

A Supreme Court that is preoccupied with equalizing, or with
providing some minimum level of protection for individuals, Will
intensify its level of scrutiny whenever fundamental rights are
substantially burdened because of classifications such as those
based on age, residence, intelligence, educational background,
health or ability to pay. But if the displeasing classification in
question is not suspect or suspicious in the same way that classifications based on race, religion, sex, alienage and illegitimacy
are, the Court should not insist on the least discriminatory alter239. Note, supra note 3, at 547. Justice Marshall's sliding scale approach would

be less objectionable if it focused solely on a tighter fit between the challenged
classification and a legitimate end. When fundamental interests are at stake, the
Court certainly should not rubber stamp classifications, but introduction of an

ends scrutiny component invites excessive judicial activism.
240. 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
241. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
result).
242. Harlan wrote: "An analysis under due process standards, correctly under-

stood, is, in my view, more conducive to judicial restraint than an approach
couched in slogans... that blur analysis by shifting the focus away [from the bal-

ancing of interests]." Id.
243. Id.

native. Strict scrutiny should be reserved for classifications
which historically reflect popular but misleading stereotypical assumptions about the inferiority of a group because of a trait that
is not indicative of its members' worth.
This is not to say that the Court should not continue to inquire
whether a burden on rights of constitutional significance is justified by the state's interests. Indeed, the balancing of competing
interests may be necessary. But if the Court determines that
there is no substantive due process violation, there is no need to
apply a stricter test than the deferential requirement, which inquires whether the challenged classification is rationally related
to a legitimate purpose. As the Court intimated, and Justice
White, concurring, made plain in Jones v. Helms, 24 4 the reason for
insisting upon a test stricter than rational basis disappears when
the burden on constitutional rights is justified, and the state's
classification is not suspect or suspicious.
When the Court combines its equal protection and due process
clause doctrines, as the Warren Court did, the combination often
has a synergistic effect that enables the Court to act more like a
superlegislature. Justice Marshall's sliding scale test in equal
protection clause cases does the same, although it is less rigid
than the "compelling interest" test. But Justice Harlan always
preferred a more restrained approach to equal protection cases,
and it is his flexible due process balancing approach that is being
revitalized by the Court.

244. 452 U.S. 412, 427 (1981) (White, J., concurring).
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